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This paper contributes to a theory of  rational choice under uncertainty for decision- 
makers whose preferences are exhaustively  described  by  partial orders representing 
"limited information".  Specifically, we  consider  the limiting case of  "Complete  Ig- 
norance" decision problems characterized by maximally incomplete preferences and 
important primarily as reduced forms of  general decision problems under uncertainty. 
"Rationality" is conceptualized in  t,erms of  a "Principle of  Preference-Basedness"  , 
according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference.  The 
main  result characterizes axiomatically  a new  choice-rule ralled "Simultaneous Ex- 
pected Utility Maximization"  which in  particular satisfies a choice-functional  inde- 
pendence and a context-dependent choice-consistency condition; it can be interpreted 
as the fair agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose play- 
ers  correspond  to the different  possible  states (respectively extremal priors  in  the 
general case). 
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Choice Consistency. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Decisions often have to be  made on the basis of  limited information.  Sometime, 
this does not present any special difliculties to the decision maker; he may still be 
willing to rank all alternatives in a complete order and simply choose the best al- 
ternative.  In other cases, this informational limitation may  be perceived as a lack 
of  adequate grounds for constructing such a ranking unambiguously; rather than ar- 
bitrarily declaring one of  two alternatives superior, or both to be inaerent,  it will 
seem more natural to acknc,wledge this lack  and suspend judgment by asserting the 
non-u~mpainbilityl  of  the two alternatives; the decision-maker's preferences are then 
to be described by  a partial rather than a complet,e ordering. 
In this paper, we  deal  with  situations in  which incompleteness arises from  lim- 
ited information about the likelihood of  uncertain event?.  In formal terms, we  will 
consider partial orders R that satisfy all of the standard consistency conditions char- 
acteristic of  Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) preferences, wit,h the exceptiun uf the 
completeness axiom.  Such partial orders can be represented as unanimity-relations 
(intersections) of  the SEU-orders associated with convex sets of  probability measures 
("belief sets" of  "acceptable  prior^")^. 
'Noncomparability is distingnished from  gmuirre indifference by  its lack of  transitivity.  In&xl, 
nnn-comparability  is typially robust  with respect to small  (unambiguous) changn in  the valup of 
the alternatives.  This is a  typiral featnre of "hard" chuices.  For  example, if you find  it dificult to 
decide whether LC, accept a jobntfer at a salary of  x dollars per year, you will find it just as difficult 
to decide at z  t 1 dollars, probably also at r t  100, maylr even at r + IMWX) dollars.  (While you 
will  probably  tR ahle to tell  the diiTercnm betwwn z and z + lWaO dollars, this may not settle the 
matter for you, as money may  r~lmply  not he the real ism) 
'This  follows  from standard representation  thmrenls.  c.g.  Smith (1961)  and  Rewley  (1986). 
Partial orders w~th  the arsumd structure have received a inathematically cornprchemive and cow 
ceptually profound treatment in Walley's  recent monograph "Statistical  R~auming  with Impreci~ 
Probabilitieb"  (1991).  Deliet-functiorw and uppcr~and  lower probahiliti-,  othpr Frequently endorsed 
generalizations  of  thc probability  calculus,  ran be viewed a  special (and restrictive) instances of 
sssrs~tng  such partial urders (r!r  \;\1I~y (IMII), ch. 4, especially p.  182-4 and 197.0). For i
ns
tance, the extreme case of  "complete ignorance" regarding the likely occur- 
rence of  uncertain events is represented by  a maximally incomplete part~al  order in 
which the decision-maker  weakly prefers one act over another if  and only  if  the act 
generates a weakly better consequence in every state; this corresponds to a belief set 
that includes all possible priors. 
For another example, a decision-maker  who is a classical statistician may well  be 
prepared  to assume quahative knowledge about the stochastic  process generating 
the observations, but will  not want  to make  probabilistic  asumptions concerning 
parameter values. Such qualitative knowledge can be described by a partial order R, 
for instance in term  uf  condition? of  '' xchangt *bilityn3;  the corresponding belief set 
may include all priors conljistent with the ,assumed qilalitative knowledge. 
The paper develops a thewry of  raticonal (or "optimal") choice for "decision-problems 
under uncertainty" (d.p.u.s)  defined by  a set of  acts X and a partial order Ron some 
universe of  acts primarily focussing on d.p.u.s characterized by complete ignorance. 
"Optimality" for partial orders has been traditionally identified with the absence uf 
feasible superior alternatives ("admissibility"). By contrast, we  will argue that upti- 
mality is nut exhausted by admisibility in that some admissible acts may be superior 
to others (in a context-dependent way) as compromzsc choices. The choice rule ana- 
lyzed in this paper, "Simultaneous Expected Ctility Xlau~nuzatlon"  (SIMEU). makes 
this intuition of  optimal choice as a best compromise formally  precise and provides 
an axiomatic justification for it. As explained in detail in section 2. SIMEU can be 
interpreted as Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution representing a fair compromise 
among "alter egos" correspondmg to the different extremal priors; it can alw be seen 
as formalizing a notion of  robustness." 
3~he  rl-ical  rrfrrence is  de Finrtti  (1937); for a discusion of  exchangeability in  the ccmtrxt of 
partial orders, see  \+'alley (ch. 9.5). 
'It  should he  ~rnphaized  that  the normative  motivation of the axioms does not  appeal to an 
intrinsic  preference  fin robustness  or  to  the  intuitive  force 1,f  the-  bargaining  metaphor.  If  such Of  the fill1 axiomatic theory underlying SIMEU, the present  paper presents half, 
namely  the limiting case of  "mauimally non-comparable"  preferences characterized 
by  all-inclusive belief sets; these  turn out to correspond  to the classical  notion of 
"Complete Ignorance" (CI);  for a still valuable introduction to the literature, which 
culminated in the early 1950's prior to Savage's "Foundations of  Statistics"  (1954), 
see  Luce/Raiffa  (1957), ch.  13.  CI problems  can  be viewed as reduced  forms of 
general d.p.u.s, i.e.  that a large class of  choice rules defined on CI problems can be 
canonically extended to the class of  general d.p.u.s. This has been shown in Nehring 
(1991, ch.2) and Nehring (11192) :  how it works is briefly sketched in section 7. 
The main conceptual innovation of  the paper in a new  ratiode fur axiomatic re- 
strictions on choices in CI proble~m,  the "Principle of  Preference-Basedness':  (PPB), 
according to which the structure of  choice shudd reflect the structure uf preference. 
This Principle yiel
ds 
a more convincing justification uf the hallmark axiom of  the clas- 
sical literature (here fornulated as "Symmetry") that leads beyond expected  utility 
m&ximizatiun; Symmetry sa:ys that since CI preferences are symmetric with respect, 
to arbitrary event-permutations, CI choices must  be symmetric in the same way. 
The Principle of  Preference-Basedness  also gives  rise t,o the other key  axiom of 
"Consequence-Isomorphism"  (CISO) which has no  precedent  in the cl
as
sical  litera- 
ture. This axiom implies invariance of  the choice rule with respect  to positive aFEne 
transformations of  consequence utilities event-by-event, and thus permits interpreting 
CI problems as bargaining problems.  It makes little sense  unless one views CI pref- 
erences as deliberately  adopted (over other logically possible preference  judgments) 
by  the decision  maker  who is  fully aware of  their extreme character.  Theorem 1. 
the main result  of  the paper, characacterizes SIlIEU as equivalent  to the conjunc- 
tion of  Admissibility, Symmetry, Consequence Isomorphism and a context-dependent, 
appeals were made, the solution could hardly stake a  claim of  being canonical.  Robustnes~ 
and compromise simply  turn oul.  to dwrihe qualitativr features of  the solution; they confirnl but 
don't ground its normative rlnirn. choice-consistency condition WAREP 
The classical literature was keenly aware of  a conflict between context-independent. 
choice-consistency conditions and independence5, and found itself unable to choose. 
Probably  representatively, Arrow (1960, p.  72) concluded  that a rational solution 
to complete ignorance  pmblenls  is impossible:  "Perhaps the most  nearly definite 
statement is that of  Milno'r (1954) who showed in effect that every proposed order- 
ing principle contradicts at least one reawnable axiom."  Based on the Principle of 
Preference-Basedness which implies a choice-functional independence condition by 
way of  Consequence-Isomorphism, SIMEU theory resolves the conflict in favor of  in- 
dependence over context-independent  c ioic3-consistency."Ve  will  argxe in section 
6.3 that what appear to be  "incon~istencies"  of  choice from a traditional perspective 
can be seen as natural cunseqliences of  asserted non-cumparabilities 
That it  is not  the independence  axiom that should give way is confirmed  by  ub- 
sewing that  the must  convincing direct  justifications  of  independence  derive  from 
the logical structlue of  states as lugically disjoint  ez post.  Yet  ignorance is part of 
the decision situation  e:c  mte,  and, as a result, has no power per  se  to undermine 
the normative appeal of  the independence axiom.'  Completeness, on the other hand, 
and in its wake  context-independent  choice-cunsistency, seem natual casualties of 
"ignorance". 
We conclude the introduction with some meta-remarks about the general approach 
that are important to an adequate understanding of  what will fullon,. In the proposed 
theory, partial orders determine choices as well-defined  wholesR; this is meaningful 
also referred to m "thr sur~rthing  principle." 
91n fact, CIS0 can he shown to h: equivalcrrt to an appropriate generalimtion of  the "sure-thing 
principle"  to d.p.o.s (see  6.2.6). 
'Of  cows, unrmlwd ignoranc~  may  cxtwr  anxiety  elc.,  and  th~rrby  lead  to  Ellsbrrgian 
uncertainty-aversion: this  prima  facic  violation  of  independence  can be accornrnodatnl by  an  ap 
propriat~  redescriptinn of  conmquencrs. 
"1.r. the optimal choicr ma> rlrprnri irxi  every frv.*t  c,f ttir partial order. only under an  exhaustive interpretation, on which absence of  weak preference (of x 
over y and of  y over x)  is equivalent to a judgment of  non-comparability ("I decline 
to prefer one alternative over another"). rather than to mere  "non-comparedness" 
as under an interpretation in terms of  partial  elicitation ("I have not made up my 
mind"). In terms of  beliefs, non-comparability corresponds to yelf-aware ignorance, 
as in "I know that I don't know" (cf. section 6.1.4).' 
In the terms of  logical status, the partial order R represents an exhaustive list of 
preferencelbelief judgments; its status is thus akin to that of  a statistical model, but 
differs in category from that of  a psychological state or behavioral dispositiun. The 
envisaged theory determines the content of  optimal choice for a wide class of  hypv 
thetically asserted partial oders R in the presence of  general  rationality conditions 
which  'are  formalized  as  axioms.  It  is a  "normative"  logic  uf choice  given  prefer.. 
ence, rather than "prescriptive"  advice wit,h the goal of  improved decision making. 
Just as in the axiomatizatiun of  a social-choice rule, the issue of  the decision-maker's 
competence or computational resources never arises. 
The paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 presents and interprets the SIMEU 
choice rule for general d.p.11.s  in the twoevent case. In Section 3, the formal frame- 
work  is  established.  Sectior~s  4 and  5  contain the key  rationality postulates of  the 
theory and axiomatize the SIZIEU solution.  A side result characterizes  the lexicu 
graphic maximin-rule which is alsu shown to coincide with Barbera-Jackson's (1988) 
"protect,ive criterion".  The axioms are discussed extensively  in section 6, with par- 
ticular emphasis on the Principle of  Preference-Basednes. The concluding section 7 
briefly sketches the extensiun of  SIXIEC to general d.p.u.s .  The appendix contains 
bits of  extra material and the proofs. 
-- 
'In  the  langnage  of  episternic: Icwc., satisfaction of  Negative Intmspxtion is a  key properly  of 
complete ignorance, which ther~hrr  tms nothing to du with "unawareness" in the sense of the recent 
literature on that topic, for which violation of  Negative Introspcctian is dperned essential (cf, blcnlica- 
Hustichini (1m.I). Dek~l-1,iprrran.-Rt~-ticlcitri  (1926)). 2.  PRELIMINARY EXPOSITION OF SIMEU 
This section is devoted  1.0  the explanat,ion of  the SIMEU choice rule for general 
partial orders in the twc-event  case.  An act z  E It'  maps consequences to cardinal 
utilities".  A belief set II is a clcwd convex subset of  A2, the unit simplex of  R2; its 
elements are called "acceptable", its extreme points n'  and n"  "extremal"  priors.  A 
"consistent" partial order 1Z  on R2 is one that can be represented as  the unanimity 
relation Rn induced by a belief set II: 
xR~  yifandonlyifn.z~n~yforalln~~. 
Note that unanimity wit:h respect to all extremal priors coincides with unanimity 
with respect to all acceptable ones. 
A tw-event  decision-prc~ldem  i~nder  uncertainty  can  then be specified as a  pair 
(X,n),  where  X  denotes  the  choice-set,  a  convex and compact  subset  of R2;  if 
= A2, the d.p.u, is one ~lnder  complete ignorance.  For simplicity,  assume that 
X  is strictly convex such  that, for  all  n E  A2. there is a  unique expected-utility 
maximizing act x(n). 
An undisputed necessary condit,ion of the optimality of  an act x is its "adrnissibil- 
ity," i.e., the absence of  any feasible alternative that is strictly preferred to it. In the 
twcdimensional case, the set of  admissible acts A(X,n)  = A(X,  KII)  =  {z € X  lfor 
no y  E X: yRnr and not xRny} traces out the boundary of  X between z'  and z". 
the optimal acts under n'  and n" respectively1': see figue  1 below. A(X,n)  may be 
understood as the set of  ac?s that compete for enactment. -While  clearly necessary, 
is admissibility suficient as a criterion of  optimality for partial orders? 
Note  that  a  positive  ansa-er to this question  would  imply  that  it  were  always 
legitimate to arrive  at a decision by  selecting  a complete order  R{,)  that extends 
the given partial order  Rrll,  with n E n. Since A(..  R(,)) c A(.,  Rn),  any  choice 
"Thesr  can be derived from a stanhwd representation  thmrmr (rf. section 3). 
"-umed  to tx unique for simplicity. optimal  under  R{,)  would  then also  he optimal  under  the original  partial order 
Rn A decision-maker  could  thus never  loose  by  adopting complete  preferences: 
some decision must be  made -  some act will  be chusen, after  all -  so what use 
is it to suspend judgment if you cannot suspend choice?  At worst, some preference 
judgment might be arbitrary  The concept of  non-comparability would be useless for 
the purpose of decision-making, pragrnaticdly  incoherent. 
To  salvage the pragmatic coherence of  assertions of  non-comparability, it is thus 
necessary to  show admissibility to be  insufiicient as exclusive criterion of  optimality, 
by providing additional crite:ria. One such criterion is that of  mbwtness. Intuitively 
speaking, an alternative lacks robustness as an optimal  choice, if  it is a very  poor 
choice from the perspective of  sctme  extremal prior.  In Figure 1, choices of  z'  or 
x"  exemplify failures of  ever1 "minimal robustness:"  while each act  performs  best 
against some prior (n' respectively n"),  it perfornms worst against  its opposite (i.e., 
n"  respectively  n') compared  to any other admissible act.  Robustness reqnires at, 
a  minimum choosing an act  somewhere in  between x'  and x".  An  alternative is 
"optimal in ternls of  robustness" if  it minimizes the risk of  being a poor choice; t,he 
SIMEU choice rule axiomatized in this paper can be interpreted as making this notion 
precise. -  It should be emphasized, however, that while the robustness interpretation 
helps to make sense of  the proposed choice rille, the axiom? themselves do not rely 
on the intuit,ively rather vague notion of  "rob~~stness;'  instead, they rely on the much 
sharper concept of  "structural isumorphism" 
The "Simultaneous Expec!.ed-L'ti1it.y  Maximization" (SIMEC) rule u is robust in 
the sense of  '5mplementing" t.ach extremal prmr n'  and n" "to the same degree". It  is 
based on a cardinal measure X of  the "degree of  implementation" defined as follows. 
with 010 =  1 by definition. We  will  often  suppress the arguments X  and  II.  In effect,  A(.,n)  is  the von 
Neumann-Morgemtern representation of  the EU preferences induced by  n  such that 
max {h(y,  rr) ly E  A(X,  II)  } = 1  and min {A(?/,  rr) /y  E A(X,  TI)  } = 0. For example 
A(zl',  n")  = 1 and A(zf',  rr') =  0. 
The SIMEU choice rule  o is  defined  as  the unique  act  that  is  admissible  and 
implements both virtual probabilities to the same degree: 
z E  u(X,  n)  z E  A(X,  n)  and A(z,  d')  = X(z;nl). 
It is easily verified that o(X,  TI) can equivalently he defined as the unique maximin 
in degrees of  implement ation, i.e., 
Geometrically, o can be constructed as follows: 
1  Figure  1 about here I 
Define two reference points y1 and  where n"  and n'  simultaneously achieve their 
maximal and minimal expected utilities.  Y'  is thus deftned by the conditions n".y' = 
n" . st' and n' .  y1 = rr'  . z',  i.e., as intersection of  the indifference-lines for n"  through 
z"  and for n'  through z'  .  Similarly,  is defined by  rr"  . yo  = n"  . s' and n' . yo = 
711 , 5". 
By co
ns
truction,  A(y',n'')  = X(yl,n')  = 1 and X(yo,n")  = A(y0,n')  = 0. By  the 
afie  definition of  A, setting y'  =  + (1 -  ?)Y',  X(y7,n1')  = y  = A(y?,n1):,  the 
straight line through y'  and yo describes therefore the locils of  acts that implement 
n"  and n'  to the same degree.  cr(X:n)  is given as the intersection of  this line and 
the admissible set A(X,  II). 
It is easy to see from this construction  that o is formally identical  to the Kalai- 
Smorodinsky  (1975) solution to a bargaining problem with two players whose pref- 
erences are the EU preferences with respect  to n' and to nu. Technically speaking. Figure  1 define a mapping q : R2+1t2,  q(x)  = (11'.x,11".2); *  maps into vectors of  (expected) 
utilities and is one-toone.  Lf ((Y,  d) is defined as the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for 
a feasible set of utilities Y and a "threat-point" dl u can be characterized by 
c:(*(x),  *(yo)) = *(up,  n)). 
Note that while yo is the threat-point (in act space), y1  is the "ideal point" in the 
terminology of  Kalai and S:morodinsky. 
To establish comparability to the definition of  a,  we shall also write { as < in term 
of  the primitives:  the feasi:ble set X  and the set of  player's preferences  II.  I.e., we 
shall write f(X,  n)  for  'V1({(*(X), @(?)'))). 
The eqnivalence can then  be restated as 
One can use this purely  furmal equivalence to interpret  0 a  the fair outcome of 
a bargaining between the dfferent  fictitious  "alter egos"  uf the decision maker given 
by  his extrenial priors. his different virtual Bayesian selves, as it were. 
This interpretation of  o as a fair bargaining solution extend? to the general (finit,e) 
case:  one can define o(X.  r[)  = F(.Y. II),  where  refers to the lexicographic  variant 
of  the A'S-solution which has been defined and aviomatized by Imai (1983)". 
3. FRAMEWORK AND NOTATION 
Let Cl  denote an infinite universe of  states, and let 3  be the set of  finite partitions 
F = {S),yEF of  R  into infinite subsets  5'.  Note that.: by  dekutiun, any  F  E 3  is 
-- 
'2cprovides an e-y  way  to themstize the role of  extremal priors.  A  plal~~ihl~  alternative  to the 
definition of SlhlEll a;. a  would be a  o'(X,  n)  z(X,  co 11); this is rliscuased in detail in Nehring 
(1991, ch.2.5), with arguments suggesting the superiority  clf lhr adopted specification of  SIhlEll  ns 
o.  For the moment, just note that whilein highw dimensions the two spxifications may eacily dilfer, 
in two dirner~iorts  lhcy are always identical; this Ins krr~  shown in Nehring (1991, ch.2), propmition 
6. infinitely divisible in the sense that any event of  any partition in 3  can be broken up 
into arbitrarily many ~ubevents'~;  the role of  this assumption is explained in remark 
1  following theorem 2. 
An act x maps states to consequences c  E  K :  z  : R -t K. For expositional sim- 
plicity, we will assume K = 10,  11, interpreting c as cardinal utility (normalized von- 
Neumann blorgenstern utility); such an interpretation can be justified  by standard 
arguments along the lines of  Anscornbe-Aumann's  (1963) twostage "horse-lottery" 
approach'4. In particular, in a world with only two final consequences ("winning" and 
"loosing", with winning preferred), x,  can be identified with the objective probability 
of  winning conditional on d. 
A well-defined choice set i:i assumed to be closed with respect to the incll~sion  of 
mixed acts, and is therefore formally represented as a convex set  uf acts X  10,  lIn. 
To canonically include mixed. acts is technically necessary and seems to be the more 
conservative  way  to proceed outside SEU-theory.  Otherwise, standard choice rules 
recommend the decision-maker to give  up utility in order to use a  random device; 
this seems inappropriate since, presumably, he could just tozs a coin in his head. 
For F E F,  let [0,  1IF denote the class of  F-measu~able'~  acts, and denote 10, 113  = 
U [0,  I]",  the class of  sin~plt:  acts . A choice-set X is simple if  it is a compact convex 
FF  F 
subset of  10,lIF  for some E'  E +  ( (0, lIF  being endowed with the Euclidean topolow); 
let X denote the class of  all simple choice-sets. Some additional  notation:  "d X"  is 
the closure of  X, "co X" is  the convex hull of  S,  and [z,  yj = m {x,  y}.  "x  < I/" 
holds if x 5 y and x,, < y,  for some w  E a,  "z  <<  y" if  z,  < y,  for all w  E  R; e" 
denotes the indicator-function of  S,  i.e., e: -  1 if  J E S, and e:  = 0  otherwise. 
A  deciszon prnblem under Complete Ignorance ("CI problem") is a pair (X. RB)  . 
13  I.e., for  each F  6 3  and each #Ftople of naloral nurdxrs (n.)st~,  there exists a refinement 
G of  F in 3  such that  #(T E GIT C  S) -  n.. 
"For  an  exp&tion  of  the theury that does  not  wums (but effectively  reduca to) j0,lj-valued 
conarquencen,  see  N~hring  (lr)95:1. 
15r is F-rneaswable iff  it is constant on each cell S  E  I.'. where X is a choice set and Rct denotes the Complete Ignorance preference relation 
defined by 
x &  y e  z,  > yu  for all w  E a. 
Since & is assumed fixed in almost all of  the following, we  will normally identify 
a CI problem (X,  Rg) with its choice set  X,  and define a choice function as a non- 
empty-valued mapping C on  X such that C(X)  C  X for all X  E X. We will write 
"x  Pn y" for  "x  Rg y and not y & x", as well  as "x  Ng  y" for  "neither z  Ryl y nor 
y &  I". 
In discussing various axioms, it will sometimes be helpful to refer to partial orders 
R other than &  cont,ained.  in some universe R uf hypothetical orders on  [O. 113.  For 
this purpose, it  sdces  to t,hink of  R as a rich class of  partial orders obtained as 
the intersections (unanimity relation?) of  scrs of  expected-utility orders Kiri , with 
denoting a (finhely addixive, say) probability  measwe on R and 
2 R{,)  y u  j"z,dri  2 J!l,,di7 
The technical details are omitted; we  just note that such classes can be axiomatized 
along the lines of  standard representation theorems in the literature1'.  In s11ch more 
general contexts, a d.p.u. is a pair (X,  H)  E  X x R, and a choice function is defined 
on the domain X x R of  such pairs. 
4. SIMEU AND LEXIIMIN: DEFINITION AND BASIC PROPERTIES. 
The following sections are devoted to an axiomatization of  SIMEU for  Complete- 
Ignorance problems, oC'. Along the way, we  also obtain a choice-functional charac- 
terization of  the lexicoaaphic maximn rule Lhl defined as follows. 
LM(X)  =  {x E X  I For ally  X:  mi~:s,fy,x,  > 
'%e  Smith (1961), Bewlqv  (19.36) and in great generality M'allry  (IWI),  a  well a  Nehrirlg (1995) 
for a statemmt dir~rtly  appropnntr to SIMEIJ throry As it reads, we  have defined LM(X) as BarberaJackson's (1988) "protective cri- 
terion". Since the following proposition shows it to coincide (on convex sets) with the 
lexicographic maximin, we  will denote it  by  LM and refer to it by  the latter, more 
informative name. 
The SIMEU rule a"'  modiies LM by  normalizing ex-post utilities; the normaliza- 
tion yields "degrees of  implementation" X,(z)  of x within X in state w (respectively: 
"for each extremal prior e"  "). 
Also, defile 
Lastly, for the sake of  comparison, t,he following lexicographic version ("LML") of 
the "minimax luss" rule first, proposed by  Savage (1951) is of  some interest: 
LAlL(X) -  LM(X -  m(S)),  with m(X)  = (maxzI,~  X,~)~~R 
Proposition 1  t) IfX E k,  LAI(X)  and or'(.';) are non-empty and stngle-valurd 
tt) Aloreouer, I/Z  E LM(.Y) and y E X\{Z), 
Remark: Part ii) is crucial for the logical consistency  of  the subsequent axiom- 
atization.  The convexity-assumption on  X is indispensable for  its validity,  as the 
co~mter-example  of  X = {(l,  0). (0,1)}  shows.'' 
"Taking  any F such that  X  5  [0,  1lF. and wewing 10, lJF  as a fintie-dimensional unit-culm,  thr 
propaition also implies  thal the unique r E  Lhl(,X)  coincides with lexicographic  maximin act a- 5. AXIOMATIZATION OF SIMEU AND LEXIMIN 
This section characterizes SIMEU and LM in complete ignorance problem?; while 
the relevant axioms are gwen a first-round  motivation. a more extensive discussion 
of  their meaning and plausibility is reserved for the next section. 
The most basic rationality-requirement is compat~bility  with asserted preferences. 
Axiom 1 (Admissibility, ADM) For all X  E  X  and x,  y  E  X:  x Po  y  implies 
Y e CP). 
If  one rewrites the condition  "x Pn  1 " in utility-terms as "for all  -LI  E Q, xd 2  yw, 
and for some L!  E Q,  x,  >  ydn,  it is evident  that ADM amommts to t,he standard 
concept of  stnct admissibility. 
The two key  axioms of  the theory are axioms of  structural equivalence.  The fist 
is based un the synunetxy of  lQ  in events.  For any one-bone map 0 : E' 4 F'  on 
event partitions E', F'  E .F,  define an associated one-t-one  map on acts  : [O. 1IF + 
[0, 1IF' by  (P(X)~(,)  = x,,  for S  E  F.  @(x)  is the act that results if the consequence 
xs  occurs in the event 4(S)  instead of  in the event S. 
Axiom 2 (Symmetry, SY) For all  X  E  .Y  and 4 :  F  --.  E'  one-to-one such  that 
X  is F-memumble: @(X)  = X  3 C(.Y)  = @(C(X)). 
SY requires  that symmetry  of  the choice set  in  events implies  a  corresponding 
symmetry of  the chosen w.  It is  a weak  version of  the hallmark axiom of  the CI 
literature (see remark 1 following theorem 1): it clearly rules out the representability 
of  C by some (as-if) subjective probability, as shown by  the following example. 
Example 1: The following matrix describes the payoffs of  four acts in term? of 
the event-partition F' = {SI,  S2,  S3). 
defined ordinarily for finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces. Suppose C to be representable by  the asif subjective probability vector (711,  712,  713). 
SY  applied to the choice set [w,x],  with F = F* and $ given by $(&) = SI,  4(S2)  = 
S3, and $(S3) = S2, implies x E  r([ui,x])  t, u, E  C([w,x])  , and thus 712 = 713. 
An  analogous application  of  SY to the choice set  [w,  y] yields  711  = 712, and thus 
1  rr, =  7r2 = 7r3 = ?. However, applying Yf to [y,  t]  with F = {S1,  S2 us3}  and 4  given 
by  $(S,)  = S2 lJ Sn: and 4(S2  U S,)  = S, implies y  c C([y.  z])  a z  E C([y,  z])  . and 
thus TI  =  712 + 713 , a contradction. 
The conceptual  basis of  the symmetry  axiom  is  clarified  by  viewing it  as spe- 
cial instance of a more general condition  of  "Event-Isomorphism".  A mapping @  : 
[0, 1IF +  [O. 1jF' obtained from some bijection 4 : F + P is an ruent-isomoqnhism 
with respect to H  if, for all :c, y  EI  [O,1IF : s  N y a @(XI  R @(y). 
Condition 1  (EISO*, Evc:nt-Isomorphisrr~)  For any event-isomoryh~sm  @ : 
10, lJF  -  [0,  lIF' with respect  11,  R and  any  X  [0,  1IF : C(@(X),  R)  = @(C(X,  R)). 
EISO'  asserts, in words, that it does not matter per se which events yield certain 
consequences as the result of specific acts, as long as the partial preference ordering 
is unaffected  by  the substitution of  events.  Note that, due to its taking account of 
the underlying preference ordering R, EISO'  is perfectly compatible with expected- 
utility  maximization for complete orders.  Indeed, it  is obvious that in  this case  @ 
is an event-isomorphism wi~.h  respect  to R if  and only if  1+4  preserves the subjective 
probability of  events. 
Since any @ is an event-isomorphism with respect to &,  one obtains as restriction 
of  EISO'  to X  A {Ro)  t,he following condition which implies SY. Condition 2  (EISO)  For all X  E X  and 4 : F -* F'  one-to-one such that X 
is F-measurable:  C(@(X))  = @(C(,Y)). 
CI-proble
ms 
are thus treated completely on par with other d.p.u.s by EISO*;  they 
are special only in the extreme richness of  symmetries of 4  which makes the appli- 
cation of  EISO'  extraurdir~arily  powerfill. 
SY and EISO'  can  be  derived  from  a  more general  "Principle  of  Pwfewnces- 
Badness" (PPB), according  to which  the  stnicture of  choice should  reflect  the 
structure of  asserted preference.  A  basic instance of  this principle is the axiom of 
admissibility, which can be viewed as a requirement to map asymmetries of  prefer- 
ence into asymmetries of  choice.  A complementary co
ns
equence of  the principle is 
the requirement to map symmetries of  preference into symmetries of  choice. This can 
be formulated in term.;  of  conditions of  "invariance with respect to order-preserving 
transformations," of  which event-isomorphisms are a special case. 
Based on a  "dnal" class of  order-presening transformations, the PPB leads to a 
"dual" axiom called "Consequence-Isomorphsm" (CISO) which allows events to mat- 
ter, but does not permit consequences to matt,er per se. The basis of  the argument for 
CISO is that non-preferenc'e information properly defined, specifically: consequence- 
information, should be rationally irrelevant in :he  determination of  choice. 
To define CISO formally, let  a  consequen<.r-isomorphism  with respect  to H  be  a 
mapping 0 from [0, 1IF to (O,l]-' (not necessarily onto) that preserves order as well 
as mixture-information  a'ua'ut acts and is separable in events, i.e., that satisfies 
i) O(r) R O(y) e r R y  Vr,  y E  [a,  11'. 
ii) O(X1: + (1 -  X)y) = XO(r) + (1 -  X)Q(y)  Vz.y E [0, l]',  0 5 X 5 1,  and 
iii) There exist  (B,),en,  0,  : [O, 11 -  [0, 11  such that D(z)  = (Ow(x,li))dtcl. 
Axiom 3 (CISO, Consequence-Isomorphism)  For all X E X  and any conseque7u:e- 
isomo~yhism  0 with respect to Hy  such that O(X) Cc  X,  C(O(X))  = @(C(X)). Remark 1: It is easily versed that  for Cl  problem, 8  is a consequenceisomorphism 
if  and only if  each 8,  is of  ithe  form 8,(c)  = a,c  + 4,,  with a,  > 0.  Hence CIS0 
requires invariance under positive afke  transformations state-by-state, 
Remark 2: The mixture-condition ii) reflects the need to preserve cardinal-utility 
information; as is well-known from bargaining theory, without it, no interesting the 
ory could be developed.  Note also that it is automatically satisfied  by  the event- 
isomorphisms considered in :EISO.'s 
As discussed in more detail  in the following section, the preceding three axioms 
are incompatible with traditional context-independent choice-consistency conditions 
such as WARP. 
Axiom 4 (WARP)  I.hr  all x, y t  X  n  Y  : x E C(X)  *  [y E  C(Y)  *  x E C:(Y)] 
In words:  if  x is chosen in X, it is  "revealed to be at least as choiceworthy as 
any alternative y in X,  hence must be chosen in Y whenever y is. 
To accommodate  the PP13, it  seem..  natural  to contain  the impact  of  context- 
dependence by  restricting WARP to pairs of  decision problems for which it is  urn- 
problematic.  A move of  this kind is quite standard in  bargaining theory (see, for 
instance, Roth (1977)). 
X  and X'  are mnge-equivdent if proj,  cl  A(X)  = proj,  cl A(X1)  for all u  E R, 
that is, if  they agree on the :set of  "admissible consequences" in each state. 
Axiom 5 (WAREP)  For  any mnge-equiualent X,  X'  E X  and x,  x' E 
x  n  x1  : x E C(X)  *  (XI  E:  c(x')  3  x  E c(xl)). 
-- 
I81t  would seem to be dairabk to unify  EISO and  CIS0 in a general axiom of  invariance  with 
respect  to order-preserving information.  We  leave this to future work,  as it is  mathematically not 
entirely trivial, rai-  further subl.le issues and since a uifid axiom would not seem to simplify the 
demonstration of the results While WAREP does not seem to rest on quite as compelling a foundation as the 
other axioms, it has the definite merit of  leading to a tractable and nicely interpretable 
solution.  Moreover, it is weak in  the sense of  being satisfied by all major CI-solutions 
proposed in the literature, and also in  that it does not determine the qualitative 
character of  the choice rule, for which SY and CISO are responsible. 
Theorem 1 uC'  is uniquely characterized by Admissibility, Symmetry, Comquence- 
Isomorphism and  WAREP. 
If  one insists on preserving context-independence, at least one of  the other axioms 
has to go.  If  one drops CISO, a charac  eriz ,tion of  leximin is obtained by  a much 
simplified proof. 
Theorem 2  LA1  iu  uniqueiy chnracte~ired  by Synanwlry. .Idmi.ssibil~ty  and  WARP. 
Remark 1: Theorems 1 .and 2 appear to be wuque in the literature in using only 
symmetry besides the shared assumptions of  admissibility and choice-consistency (as 
well as CISO in the case of  theorem 1). From Milnor (1954) on (see also Luce/Raiffa 
(1957)),  most me in addition an axiom based on some idea of  description-invariance. 
This conceptually not improblematic requirement  can be dispensed with due to the 
inbitedivisibility msurnption on the partitions F E F.  It has been the main reason 
for making that assumption in the first place. 
Remark 2:  The two themems are the first in  the literature that make Symmetry 
and stnct Admissibility  compatible without  an ad-hoc qualification of  the axioms. 
The problem  uf  their apparent incompatibility has in fact  been (at least implicitly) 
a major issue of  the CI-literature in the 80's.  Maskin (1979), the first  cont,ribution 
to that issue, had to impose an ad-hoc restriction on the applicability  of  "Column 
Duplication", Barbera/Jack!ion (1988) in effect restrict the requirement of  preference 
completeness.  Lastly. Cohen and Jaffray  (1980, 1983) felt forced  to demand only 
"approximate satisfaction"  of  certain conditions. Remark 3:  Theorems 1 and 2 are also unique among axiomatizations of  "maximin- 
type" solutions in that they do not make any assumption of  "uncertainty-aversion," 
be it in the form of  a quasi-concavity condition on preferences, as Milnor (1954) and 
Barbera/Jackson  (1988) do, or of  a convex-valuedness assumption, which would be 
the choice-functional equivalent.  We are enabled to drop such a condition by  lemma 
2 for which strict Admissibility is crucial. 
In the literature, Complete  Ignorance is defined in  terms of  finite  universes of 
events; part 1 of  the appendix shows how the characterization theorems of  this section 
apply to finite universes via a.n embedding argument. 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Symmetry and Event-Isomorphism  -- 
1. The PPB can be understood as a "second-ode~  consequentinlism"  tying choices 
to aserted (consequentialist) preferences over acts and, as a result. to the valuation 
of  consequences and expectation5 of  events contained in  those preferences.  It rules 
ont additional "security considerations"  as in Isaac Levi's (1980, ch.7) theory.  Nor 
is it compatible with the use of  (non-preference) information about events, such as 
the existence of  "idtimate and indivisible  event,^"  as in Keynes (1921, p.64) or the 
structure of  language as in Carnap (1952). 
Note  that even  if one  grants the philosophical  meaningfulness  of  such pieces of 
information, it is unclear why they should and how they could be relevant for decision- 
making. In particular, if a decision-maker is prepared to  accept their relevance, should 
this not  be reflected in his preference-judgments directly? 
2. EISO* is appealing because it excludes the use only of  information that typically 
is irrelevant anyway, namely information about the natue  of  events; its interpretation requires care, however, since seemingly counterintuitive implications for CI-problems 
arise almost at once. Consider, for instance, example 1 of  section 5. SY implies both 
x E C([z,  y]) t, y E  C([Z,:Y])  and z E C([z,  u]) a y  E  C([z,  Y]).  This simultaneous 
equivalence might  be viewed as conflicting with the evident superiority of  x over  z 
(due to the dominance z  ;>  z); that is, the argument  would run, one should assert 
= C(b,~l). 
Yet, since  the partial ormder  Rg  already  captures this dominance relation, an ar- 
gument from dominance is simply an argument  based on the decision-maker's own 
preferences.  As such, it  lacks force because first, the implied superiority of  z to y 
conflicts with the asserted non-curnparal ilit;  of  x and y, and secondly, because the 
argument is based on a transitivity principle:  if z is indifferent to/weakly  preferable 
to y, x is strictly preferable to 2,  then s must be strictly preferable to y.  However, 
invoking this principle shows only via modus t,ullens that the equivalence of  chuice 
x  E C(X) e  y  E C(Y)  cannot  he interpreted as indifference; but again, this simply 
reflects the fact  that Ha  asserts non-comparability  of  x and y,  not  indifference, and 
that the non-comparability  ArO  is inherently Intransitive 
3.  Note also the essential  contexl-dcpcndenrc of  the asserted equivalence:  for in- 
stance, SY does not imply  z  €  C(co {x.  y,z}) a y  E C(cn  {x,  y,  2)); this context- 
dependence, combined with that of  the companion axiom CISO, naturally engenders 
a context-dependent choice rule. A context-~ndependent  version of  SY  (i.e. one that 
asserts eqnivalences of  the  form  "z E  C(X) e  !/  E  C(X),  for  all  X  3 y, z ") 
would confljct with (slnct) Adrnis~ibility'~.  Such context-independent versions come 
with  the vely set-up in  contributions which define alternatives as sets of  possible 
consequencesz0, as well as in Jaffray's (1989) mixture-space approach. 
I9  as well  ZLS  with  the conjunction  of  weaker cunditiom  of  Admkihility and independence  (see 
6.2.5. helow) 
''The  must  recent  contribution  to  that  literature,  Nehring-Puppr  (1945). contains  further 
references 4.  SY may also be viewed as expressing a "principle of  insufficient  reason".  It is 
desirably  weaker  than the classical  Laplacian version by  merely asserting context- 
dependent equivalences of  choice, not indifferences or equiprobabilities.  This makes 
it possible to apply this principle to arbitrary event  partition? simultaneously  and 
thereby to genuinely reflect  complete ignorance." 
It may seem that even it its revised version some knowledge on part of  the decision- 
maker must implicitly be assumed to obtain any determinate restriction on choice.22 
Indeed, it is "assumed" that when asserting Rq  the decision-maker acknowledges and, 
in this sense, "knows of" his complete ignorance about events.  In  other words, the 
symmetly axiom and indeed the axiomatic approach as a whnle are meaningful only 
on an exhaustive interpretation of 4  as an incomplete preference relation. 
1. Consider a typical instance of  CISO 
Example 2: 
Let X =  (I, yl, Xt = [x,  yt], and assume O<  t < 1. Since z Np  y as well as x Nyl  y', 
and as X'  can be obtained from X  by  replacement of  consequences, CISO implies 
y E C(X)  a yt E C(X
C). 
"Dating  hark to the nineteenth century, there has kerl  a long tradition ol criticism of the principle 
in ifs Laplocian fom  which  has tin:n  revived in  recent years under  the name of  "non-informative 
Bayesian priors" (see Berger (1985, ch.3) lor a review and MBlley (1991, ch.5) for an extended critique 
of  non-informative  priors). 
22~therwise,  "sornell,ing2'  would apppnr to come from "nothing".  However, complete ignorance is 
not "nothing"; rather, it corresponds to an extreme and cornmittmi agncaiticisrn On first  blush, this implication  seems wild,  since  it  holds  for  arbitrarily small 
positive  E.  While it seems  perfectly  reasonable to choose  y  in X, who would not 
choose x over  yL  in Xt? After all, x might be much better than y'  (in S1)  which at 
best might only be slightly better (in Sz). S~.ch  a reaction forgets, however, that the 
decision-maker could have asserted this preference himself, but explicitly declined to 
do so  by  asserting x  Nfl f.  There is no reason to patronize him and override his 
asserted preference. 
2.  In effect, CISO as.ser.ts the inappropriateness of  inter-event comparisons of  ex- 
post utility, whether in te:rms of  utility levels as in maximin and its variants, or in 
terms of  utility differences as in the mnimax loss rule. CIS0 is thus responsible for 
the bargaining interpretation of  the proposed choice nile." 
3. The case for CISO rests entirely on the Principle of  Preference-Basedness; this 
principle is what justifies CISO's exclusion of  evidently meaningful and prima facie 
important information such as the utility-differences between acts ln different states. 
The PPB implies that while  such differences  are  undoubtedly  cn~cial  in  ratiunal 
preference-formation,  they are irrelevant  once preferences have been formed - once 
preferences are cuntrolled for, as one might put it in another jargon. 
EISO, by  contrast, doe:;  nut  involve the exchsion of  any  "apparently relevant" 
information, as argued abc~ve.  In the light  uf this difference it becomes clear why no 
version of  CIS0 has ever appeared in  the traditional CI-literature while EISO-type 
axiom? occupy such a central place. 
-- 
231ndeed, from the formal point of view, the axlurnatication of  SlhlEll under Complete Ignorance 
can be vieu1e-d  a-  simply another characterization of  the Kalai-Smorodinsky tiargaining solution (with 
endqenous  threat point) in the context of  a variable (or infinite) number of agents. However, within 
the horizon of  bargaining theory, our result seems to be of  limited interest, since the .axiom  that is 
nminly rwponsible for the qualitative character uf  the choice rule ("Symmetry" in  the infinite, and 
"Embedding"  in  the finite vermon) lacks appeal, for it amounts to aswming that the solution do- 
not depend on the nurnber of agrnts holding a particular prefererlcr ord~ring  over social state. 4. It also follows that justified acceptance of  CISO must be accompanied by accep 
tance of  EISO. Thus, the class of  hargaining solutions that make sense in the present 
context is severely restricted; in particular, EISO implies that the solution cannot 
depend on the number of  players with identical  preferences, as for instance adapta- 
tions of  the Nash solution wc~uld  imply. When WPJlEP is assumed in addition, the 
lexicographic Kalai-Smorodin.sky solution is already  uniquely singled out.  Thus, its 
privileged status does not hinge implicitly on a special egalitarian concept of  fairness 
between alter egos, as would be the case for instance in an axiomatization that relies 
on a Kalai-Smorodinsky type "monotonicity" axiom. 
5. As EISO, CISO can be viewed as an i
ns
tance of  a general axiom of  consequence- 
isomorphism CISO* for arbitrary  R. 
Condition 3 (CISO')  I%T  any (X.  H)  E XxR  nnd any ronvrperrce-~somurphzsrr~ 
Q ?mth rrspect to R, C(O(X),  1%)  = O(C(X,  R)) 
Observation 1  i) For my  fl  E 7?  . any 6'  of the for~n  Q,,(r)  = nc + i!,, urith n > 0. 
is  order-prrsening with ~spect  to H. 
ii)  IJR ti  complete, any cor~~eq~~rnce-isomorphism  w.r.t. R is  of  this form. 
Part ii) of  the observation !shows the compatibility of  CISO* with expected-utility 
maximization for complete R. Part i) implies that choice-functions satisfying CISO' 
must satisfy the following choice-functional independence condition. 
Condition 4  (IND, Independence)  For all X E  X,  s E  10, 113  and 0 < X  < 1: 
C(XX + (1 -  X)r.  R) = hC(Jf.  H)  + (1 -  X)x. 
6. In combination with the reduction condition CIR described in section 7, CISO 
implies, beyond independence, a  "sure-thing principle" (STP) which determines for 
a particularly simple class of' decision proble
ms 
how choices respond to the "condi- 
tioning" of  preferences that results from a partial resolution of  the uncertainty. It  is shown in Nehring (1991, ch.l), that in the presence of  CIR, STP and CIS0 are in 
fact equivalent. 
8.3 On the Rationale for Context-Indeoendence 
It follows easily from exa.mples 1 and 2 that for single-valued choice-functiom  the 
conjunction of  EISO and CIS0 implies 
11 
.z  N0  y=+C([~,y])={~z+-y}.  2  (1) 
This  "coin-flip property"  (1)  endows judgments of  non-comparability  with well- 
defined  opctnlional menning.  It also entails that one cannot hope to reconcile these 
axioms  with traditional context-independent  choice-consistency conditions such a 
IVARP. Indeed, the coin-flip property (1)  violates even "contraction comistency" a. 
Condition 6  ("on)  Poi  all X,  Y 6 X  such that S  3 Y  and x E Y  : s  E C(S)  + 
z E C(Y). 
To see huw essential context-dependence is to SIMEU, consider in figure 1  of section 
2  the subset  X' of  all  act:;  in X  above the straight  line through  and Y'. While 
n(X,n)  is still feasible in :Y',  it is now  worst against  T' within the set of  admissible 
acts d(X1,  n)  = d(.Y. n)  n X'  ; as a  result, to preserve even minimal robustness. 
o(Xf,II)  rnmt be "to the left" of  n(X,n),  with lower  payoff in state one and higher 
payoff in state two, thus violating condition n. 
Interestingly, similar  phenomena of  context-dependence have been observed in a 
multi-attribute context2"uite  systematically in consumer-choice experiments  (see 
Simonson-Tversky  (1992) and Tversky-Simonson (1993));  there is even a significant 
overlap with SIMEU  theory  in  the way  these  authors describe  and explain their 
 or an pxtr~tiion  of the thr*lry to  a multi-attribute rontcxt, see Nehring  (1'305, s.9) findings psychologically (independently from us), in particular in their use of  notions 
such as "compromise effect" and "extremeness aversion". 
In the present non-comparability-based approach, the necessity of  violating WARP 
should come as no surprise.  Indeed, since CIS0 and EISO express the requirement 
that the choice-function take proper account of  the (non-transitive) non-comparability 
inherent  in the structure of  the underlying  partial order 4, WARP'S radical in- 
compatibility with these axioms is simply tantamount to its inappropriateness.  By 
contrast, the case against WARP  had been less clear in the traditional symmetry- 
based approach to Complete Ignorance in which Symmetry and Independence were 
motivated by entirely different considerations, rather than being unified by  the PPB. 
The inherent context-dependence of  SIMEU allows to resolve an apparent tension 
between the assumed exhamtive interpretation of  the underlying partial order and 
the single-valnedness of  the derived choice-rule:  how  can an act  x be legitimately 
chosen over another (y)  when the decision maker has deliberately suspended jndgment 
between them? The answer is that suspension of  judgment involves abstention only 
from expressing a definite preference of  s over  y,  and thus, given ADM, abstention 
from context-independent choice of  x over y. However, it is not di5cnlt to show that 
for any x,  y such that xN@y,  any choice of  x over  y is context-dependent,  i.e.  that 
there exist X',  Xu  3 {x,  y} such that  {x}  = C(X')  and {y}  = C(X1').  Intuitively, 
non-comparability rules out t.he choice of  one act over another as intrinsically better, 
but is compatible with the choice of  one act over another as a superior compromise 
in the context of  a particular choice-set. 
A  particularly clear-cut  instance  of  this distinction occurs in  the choice among 
just two alternatives, where SIMEU recommends the Aipping of  a fair coin. Clearly, 
the only conceivable advantage of  such randomization is the symmetric treatment of 
both alternatives; this may not seem much.  On the other hand, it seems obvious 
that given the assumed suspension of  judgment one cannot really hope to do better. 
Psychologically, some dissatisfaction may still remain. But perhaps such dissatisfac- tion reveals  just  how hard it is to honestly face genuine ignorance and to silspend 
judgment  accordingly.  In  this vein, Elster  (1989, p.  5459) argues  that as a  rule 
there is a psychological bias against its acknowledgment.  He makes a strong case for 
the existence of  a human fendency to exaggerate the support of  many decisions by 
"reasons," summarizing (on p. 58):  "The toleration of  ignorance, like the toleration 
of  ambiguity more generally, does not come easily."25 
6.4.  WAREP 
The only axiomatization in the litera iue of  a choice rule that reconciles Symmetry 
with Independence is Milnur's (1954) axiomatization of  the minimax loss nlle. Milnor 
assumes that a complete ordering"%f  acts can be established that may vary across 
choice-sets; while his approach implies IVAREP, it assumes much more. 
Technically, WAREP falls far short of  implying the existence of  a complete tran- 
sitive ordering of  acts in  range-equivalent prublems, due both to the convexity as 
sumption on choice-set,s and the range-equivalence restrict,ion inherent  in WAREP. 
Conceptnally, the statns OF context-dependent orderings is unclear since nothing op 
erational (no hypothetical choices) corresponds to them.  The comparative weakness 
of  WAFLEP2'  implies alsu that significantly more careful constructions are required 
-- 
"Elster  also supports the "Solorrwnic" uw oi randornimtion in situations of  ignorance. 
28''0rdering"  refers here to a.n ordering generating the choice-function, rather than to the nmier- 
lying preference relation &. 
2'7'~o  remarks on the technical Minition of  WAKEP: 
I. One might consider defining range-equivalence alternatively hy:  lLVu  E  12  : proj,X  -  proj,X'  " 
However,  this would  make  the rhoire ruk highly dependent on the addition or deletion oi .trirtiy 
dominated arts. The present  :'urrnulation  avoid5 this, implying the condition  " d(X) -  d(X') * 
C(X)  = C(X')  dX,  X' ". 
2.  It  would  he  preferable  to specify  range-equivalericr:  without  using  the topolo@cal  concept 
of  cloliure,  ir., as  'Vu  iw  fl:  pro],  d(X) I  pry,  d(X')". This is  not  p-ible  in general, since 
curnpactnes of  X Lih  to  imply that nld(X)  in more than mu dirrrensiow (See Arrow et al.  (1953). to  obtain a characterization result. 
7. CONCLUDWG REMARKS 
1.  Due to their  rich structure,  the analysis of  Complete Ignorance problems is 
quite easy and fruitful.  Their conceptual simplicity makes them also appealing to 
intuition.  Yet, this is the sin~plicity  of  a logical extreme case.  As such, it naturally 
tends to generate extreme implications.  Their frequent  apparent contrariness  to 
common sense reflects the fact  that in most situations it is simply  unreasonable to 
assert Ct preferences R+.  Contemplating what rationally would have to be chosen if 
one wese completely ignorant brings to Light  that one generally has beliefs over many 
events, that is:  that one is prepared to bet if  betting one must. Complete Ignorance 
problems are thus relevant primarily because they can be viewed as "reduced fom" 
of  general d.p.u.s 
2.  The axiomatically grounded  reduction of  general d.p.u.s is  brought  about by 
a condition of  "Complete  Iglurance Reduction"  (CIR)2R.  In the tw*event  case, it, 
reads as follows (using the notatiun of  section 2). 
CIR associates to each d.p.u. an equivalent CI problem "in expected utility prc+ 
files"; these are obtained from taking t,he expected utility of  an act with respect to 
each extremal prior. 
3. As far as we  know, the cmnly  other approach of  extending choices in CI-problem 
to a reawnably general  class of  d.p.u.s is Jaffray's  (1989) mixture-space approach 
Cornpactnes.  of A(X)  is guarantwd, on the other hand, if  X is a polyhedron. 
"See  Nehring (1992), for a brid puhlishedstaternent, and Nehring (1991), ch.2 for a more extensive 
discussion; it is also elTecLively shown there (in a slightly different setting) that a choke rule defined 
on the claw of CI problems ha  a CI11 extension if  and only if  it satisfies EISO. (MSA) taken up by Hendon et al. (1994). We note the following differences between 
the mixturespace approach and ours.  The MSA  applies only to "belief-functions" 
which correspond to a rather restrictive class of  belief sets. Since, moreover, the MSA 
describes acts in terms of  maqinal belief-functions on consequences, axioms that rely 
on an a Savagelike event-based definition of  acts such as CISO or ADM cannot even 
be stated within the MSA; for the same reawn, the PPB itself cannot be meaningfully 
invoked to guide rational choice, nor can choice-rules such as LML or SIMEU even 
be defined within the MSA. There is also an important conceptual difference in terms 
of  interpretation.  While the MSA takes the underlying belief-function (respectively 
lower probability) as representing given evic'tnce, an agent's  incomplete preference 
relation is viewed here as the outcome of  the agent's judgment, and, in this sense, as 
something chosen.  The appeal to the agent's active suspension of  judgment (inherent 
in the very  definition of  CI preferences on an exhaustive interpretation) has  been 
central to our just,ification 3f the key  axioms Symmetry and CISO in section 6. 
4. Finally, the approach adopted in this paper of  determining the choice implica- 
tions of  hypot,hetically asserted partial orders poses subtle questions regarding the 
logical status of  such parti.31 orders.  In particular, it  is  not obvious to what extent 
(if any) this involves sacrificing the traditional zdrntification of  preference and binary 
choice.  While a more detailed analysis is left t,o fiit~lre  work
zg, it  should be pointed 
out that in a straightforward  but important sense, no such sacrifice is involved.  For 
the theory itself  establishes a  tight  connection between  preference  and choice.  In 
particular, as mentioned in section 6.3, for SIMEU mazimizers asserting two acts to 
be non-comparable is cc-extensive  to randomized choice between  them (with equal 
probabilities) 
2g~or  a first attempt in this direction, see  Nehring (1995) which distinguishm three levels of this 
issue. APPENDIX 
Al. Extension of Theorems  1 and 2 to Finite Universes 
To derive versions of  theorems 1 and 2 for finite universes, one has to interpret 3 
as  a class of  conceivable "universes"  F described  by finite sets of  "states" (atomic 
events); each F may  be thought of  as a "framework of  description"  related  by  the 
common "language" 0. 
A CI-problem is now defined as a pair (X, hF)  such that F E 3  and X is a compact 
convex subset of  [O,  1IF.  Let  D'  = {(X, hF)  1  X  2 10, I]'};  a solution is defined 
on the class of  such  problems  Ll =  U  DF. The amom  are now applied to each 
1-c 7 
subdo~nain  separately. 
The snbdomains can be linked by  an embedding condition 
Axiom 6 (EMB) If  X C  [O. ljF andG i~  n mfinernent of 1',  C(X,  hF)  = C(X,  G). 
EMB can be read as saying that if a given frame F with complete ignorance Hi  is 
refined to G, that refinement should not affect the chosen set per se, i.e., as long as 
no preference is asserted bey,~nd  those affirmed by hF  and implied by the consistency 
axioms on preferences. Following the terminology of  \Valley  (1991, ch. 3.1).  this may 
be described as  "Natural Extension" property . Noting that for any F, G E F  there 
exists H E 3  that is a refinement of  both F and G', EMB implies that 
C may  thus be viewed as delined on X only, and, with EMB in place, the axioms 




1 and 2 carry over. 
Remark: Although one now nee
ds 
to refer to CI-problems in alternative hypothet- 
ical  universes of  events, as the trad~tional  CI-literature does, the present approach still has the significant conceptual advantage that it  does not  make the assumption 
that the frame of  reference is irrelevant. Such an assumption  is implicit  in the tradi- 
tional treatment of events as  "generic events without names" which can be formalized 
in the current setting by: 
" For  all  F,G  E 3  and  any one-to-one map 4 : F -.  C :  @(C(X,  %))  = 
C(@(X),  Rf)  "  . 
A2. Proofs 
For future reference, a set X C  [0, 1lr  is called normalized if, for all d c R,  proj, 
cl  A(X)  = [0,1]  or proj,  cl  A(X)  = (1). 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Since  LM and o"  agree on normalized choice-sets, it  evidently nlffices to prove 
the proposition for  Lhl. Let  b'  E 3  be any part,ition such that X is  F-measurable. 
For G C  F,  define p(.Y. G)  =  rnarc.Y minsCr: xs and MAI(X.  G)  = argmax,~.~  mins, (;  r.< 
The key  to the proof is the following lemma. 
Lemma 1  If X  is conoer,  then then ends T  E  G such that. for  all  x  E  X : 
x E  MM(X,G')  +  XT =  p(X,C). 
Proof of lemma. 
The following simple fact. will be used repeatedly: 
For any x  E hllZf(X,(:)  and S E G:  xs 2  p(X.G).  (2) 
Suppose the claim of  the 1,snuna to be false , i.e.  that for every 7'  E G there exists 
zT  E  MM(X,  C) snch tha.t  z?  > p(X,  C:).  Then, set,ting z'  = 1  &zT  (E X by 
Ttc 
convexity), in view of  (2),  mins,~  z$ > p(X;  C:),  a contradiction. 0 
Let  F(0)  = F,  X(') = X,  and 11 = #F. Fork = 0, ..., n-  1, define inductively x('+') = MM(x(*),  ~('1)  ,  and  F("+') = 
F(')\{S(~}, where s(~)  is any T ci  F(~)  satisfying t,he property asserted in the lemma 
for (X(*),  F(')). 
It is easily verified by  induction that for all k 5 n -  1 : x(')  is non-empty, compact 
and convex. Fix some < 6 x("-'),  and consider any y  E X\{<}. 
We will show that 
This implies  y  6  Lhf(X),  and , since y  is arbitrary and LAl(X) is non-empty, 
indeed  LAi(X) = {C},  from which the asserted properties of  LM follow in view of 
(3). 
To  show  (3), assume  thal  y.~  >  es  for  some S  E F; otherwise  (3) is satisfied 
trivially. Let  v =mins,F{(s  (s < ys}> and let 6'  be the largest integer k such that 
Estkr  5 1). 
We  will show  that for some  k 5  k',  < Cscii. Rom this (3) follows, since 
k 5 k'  implies, for any  k,  k', ,I(x(').  F(')) < p(~(''),  ~("1) (by definition) which in 
turn implies fs(i, 5 (sikz,  by  lemma 1. 
Suppose that the last  claim is false. i.e. that 
Let  zE  =  E  - y + (1 -  E) . (. Fur sufficiently small but strictly positive  E, the following 
three properties are satisfied: 
i) z:(,~  2  , for all k  5; k'. 
ii) r:,,,  > ESik, , for wme k 5 k'. 
iii)  z;,~~  > v , for all k > k'. 
i) is straightforward from 1:4); ii) follows from the definition of  k* and (4);  iii) finally 
follows from the fact that  > v , for all  k > k'  if  E  is chosen sufficiently small. 
i) and iii) imply  re E x(~)  , for all k 5 k'.  But then ii) contradicts lemma 1, the 
desired contradiction. . Proof of Theorem 2: 
Necessity of  the first  three properties is straightforward, and that of  WAREP is 
implied by part ii) of  proposition 1. 
To show suEciency, note first  that WAREP implies the following property IDA 
("Independence of  Dominated Alternatives"): 
(IDA)  A(X)=  A(X') 3 C(X)  = C(X1)  V X,  X'  E  A'. 
It thus involves no loss of :generality to restrict attention to normalized choicesets. 
A choice set  Y  C  [0, ljF will  be called  F-comp~he~ive  if  z'  5 x ,  x E Y  , and 
x'  E  [0,  11'  imply z'  E Y. 
Essential to the proof are the following tm  lemmas: 
Lemma 2  lfY  is F-measwnhlr md  Y  i.s  symmetric with respccl to all a: [@,/]" - 
[O,lIF  that leave  evenls ouhirie G &  F  inmnant (i.e.  such that @(z)~  = r7,  'd'l'  E 
F\G). then any 3-  E C'(.Y)  i.7  conslant on IJG. 
Proof. By  CIS0 and IDA, Y  can assumed to be normalized and F-comprehensive. 
The proof  is  by  contradiction:  suppose  that  C(Y)  contains an act { that is  not 
constant on IJC.  Let  u = minStC cS, and let  So be any  S E  G such t,hat Es  = u. 
Also, let  P  E F  be any  partition obtained from  F by  splitting  So into {S1.  S2}  : 
F' = {S E  F  1  S # So}  IJ {S,,  S2). 
Define q : [0, lIF -+ [O,llr'  by 
minrtc zr  if S = S, 
lf S = S2 
utherwise. and let Y' = {z E  [O, 1IF'Jx  5 y for some y E Y), the "F-comprehensive hull" of 
Y. 
Z has the following propel-ties: 
i) ( 6 Z  Y'. 
ii) VS  E F' : projs  d  A(Z)  =:  projs  cl A(Y) = projs  cl A(Y1)  = [0,1]. 
iii) Z is symmetric w.r.t, all event-isomorphisms @ : [O, 11"  -  [O,  11"'  that leave 
all events in (F\G)  U {Sl}  invariant. 
Note that i) follows from the definition of  So , ii) hinges on the inclusion of eS1 in 
Z, and iii) follows from the symmetry assumption on Y. 
Since A(Y1)  = A(Y),  from IDA., 
Hence, using properties i) and ii) of Z. by  IVAREP also 
Since f  is non-constant. fur  some S3  F  C : (so < tS3.  Let "I F F F  permute 
So  and S3, leaving other events invariant, and let 9' : F + F  permute S2 and S3, 
leaving other events invariam, with associated @ respectively @'.  By property iii) of 
Z, @'(Z)  = Z;  tzsing SY, it tyni~s  follows from (6) that 
By WAREP, from  (5),  (7) and properties i) and ii) of  Z also 
a'  (f)  E C(Y1).  (8) 
However, by  the symmetry assumption on Y, Y and hence Y' contain also  (5). 
Noting  @ (t)S, = Es3 > hi  = a' (C)sl  and @ (0  s, = @'  (C) s,,  one ha  @ (0  > 
@' (f). By  admissibility.  @'  (0  6  C(Y1),  in contradiction to (8). 0 Lemma 3  Consider any n~~nnalized  X,  y E  X,  and F such that X  h F-measumble. 
If then: exists z E  X  .such that: 
i)zs>O  VSEF, 
it) r is  cor~~tant  on {S  t F  /  z,s # ys} , and 
iii)  for some S E F : zs > ys  , 
then  y$C(X). 
Proof:  Take any X, F and y, i  E X  with the properties assumed in the statement. 
of  the lemma. Partition F into the following three collections of events , fixing some 
S such that zst  > ys, . 
F = {S'), 
F"  =I {S E F \ {Sf}  1  zs  # ys} ,  and 
F":={SE  F1  2.5  -- yS} 
It is clear that events S such that #projs  .Y  = 1 make no difference; hence, assume 
w.1.o.g.  that there are no such events.  Take any suficiently  large integers  I  and IIL 
such that 
2  #F . 11L 
711  >. --  and 1 > 
mins  2s  (is, -  Y.S)  (9) 
Let G E F  be a refinement of  !.'such  that S'  is "replicated" 1 times (i.e. such that 
#{T  E G  I 7'  S') =  1  )  arid any  S # S' is replicated nl  times.  Also, let C'  (resp. 
G". G"')  denote the corresponding refinement of  F'  (resp. F".  F"'). 
Let  4'  be the class of  p(prm11tation.s d of C that  leave events  uut,side G"  IJ G" 
invariant  (i.e. events such that 7'  4 G' li  C:"  3 4(T)  = T). Likewise, let  9"  be the 
class of  those permutat,ions d of  G  such that, for  all T €  G, m(7') is a "replica" of 
the same event in F as 7'  (ie. such that VT E G,VS E 1.'  : S > 7' +  S 2 d(T)),  and 
let Q*,  @** denote the associated classes of  event-isomorphisms  : 10.1)" -  [O. 11'. 
Define a choice-set Z a  f,3llows: 
Z  :-  co  ({z)  IJ {Q(y)}oto. IJ E)  , 
with E  =  {e
H  111  :=  TI IJ  7;  for sume TI.  T2  E G.  TI # T2 1 If  F' = 0, the claim follows directly from admissibility; assume thus F' # 0 which 
implies z,,  < 1 in view of  assumption ii). Hence any eH  E E such that 11 n S'  # 0 is 
admissible, which implies proj~  A(Z) = [0,1]  VT E G. Z is thus range-equivalent to 
X. 
Take w E C(Z)  and express w as convex combination: 
w = Xi:* +  Xo@(y)  + C Ar,eH. 
OF*.  FHEE 
For any S 6 F,  Z is symmetric under all permutations 4 : G -  G leaving events 
outside  S invariant.  By  lemma  2,  w must  thus  be  constant  on each  S  E  F, i.e. 
F-meawrable. 
1  It is ah  not difficult to verify that, for any F-measurable act x,  x =  w@(x). 
OtO.. 
and, in view of  (Q), that :  > ;$en  >  1  &rfi(eH)  for all eH  E E. 
OCO.. 
Thus, by  the admissibility  uf  u:. All = 0  for all  I1 mch that rH  E E (for otherwise 
w < (A,  + Ce~tL.  AH)Z + COt9.  A@@ (Y)  . contradicting the admissibility of  w). 
This shows w E  %' = cn  ({z}l~  {@(Y)}ote.). 
By  the admissibility  of  u; in  Z'. the fact  that  for any  z  E  %'  :  x  ~,,(<;(, ,c,,,  = 
z%,(~~,.,~,,,,  and the convexity of  Z',  it follows from a standardsupporting-hyperplane 
argument  that ui  must  maximize  C  ~7.5~  in Z'  for appropriate  non-negative 
TE  G'vG" 
coefficients nT. Since Z' is synmetric under all permutations @ E $'  by consrrnction. 
w  must be constant on IJ(G'  U C") by  lemma 2; moreover, t,he nr can assumed to 
be constant  (=  1) as well; it  foUows that  ul  must  in  fact  maximize  C  ZT in 
~'~G'JG" 
2'. Since this is uniquely done by  t in view of  the assnmption on 1 in (9), it follows 
C(Z)  = {z}, and in  particu1a.r y  $ C(Z).  Since z  E  X,the claim then follows from 
WAREP.  0 
Proof of theorem 1, ctd.: Fix any F such that A-  is  F-measurable. By IDA, X 
can be assumed to be F-comprehensive.  Let  rrC"(X)  = {E). By proposition 1, for some S E  F, zs > ys.  Since t 5 (  and by the F-comprehensiveness 
of  X,  it follows that z E  X. Thus X,  y,  z, F satisfy the properties assumed by lemma 
3 which yields  7~ -$ C(X).  It B~llows  that C(X) = uCL(X)  by  the non-emptiness of 
C.. 
Proof of  Thcorem 2: 
Theorem 2 can be demonstrated using a sigdicantly simplified version of  the proof 
of  the Theorem 1. . 
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